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 1
[The] mountain in the rain or the mountain in fine weather are, for 
the painter, easy to depict … but the fact that from fine weather [it] 
tends to rain, or that from fine rain [it] tends to return to fine 
weather … when the whole landscape is lost in confusion: emerging-
immersing itself, between there is and there is not – this is what is 
difficult to depict (Laozi, cited in Bayart, 2007, p289). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper will begin its course by taking up the work of Gabriel Tarde 
on the economy but as a signpost to what is occurring in the present1. In 
other words I will use Tarde as a staging post in a longer and more 
involved history of what I will call propensity, understood jointly as both 
a tendency-cum-attraction and an innate inclination, that is, as a 
disposition to behave in a certain way which is only partly in the control 
of the agent. In other words, I want to produce an account of 
contemporary ‘societies’ in which the biological can be on much the 
same footing as the cultural (if, indeed, that is a distinction worth having) 
In turn, I want to argue that this blurred vision can become the foundation 
of a different kind of political economy – a political economy of 
propensity - which understands the promise of the economy in quite 
different ways, ways which are gradually starting to reflect back upon 
themselves and so produce new economic technologies. 
 
Let me start with two different but related examples. In the year 1597, 
when Yang Shicong, a Ming dynasty official, was born, no one in his 
home province of Shandong to the south of Beijing had tasted tobacco. 
Few Chinese anywhere had. In all likelihood introduced into China from 
the Philippines, there were some tobacco smokers on the Southeast coast, 
and the leaf had found its way to Beijing where it appears on lists of 
purchases as a very expensive luxury. But Yang is at pains, in Collected 
Writings from Jade Hall (1643), to emphasize just how quickly the 
situation changed. By the time he arrived to take the examinations that 
would assure his progress up the bureaucratic hierarchy, smoking was 
well established in the capital. ‘Yang dates tobacco’s arrival in Beijing to 
the reign of Emperor Tianqi who was enthroned in 1621 and died six 
years later. Beijing farmers, he writes, have been cultivating tobacco for 
‘the last twenty years’’ (Brook, 2008, p121). The shift to ‘eating’ or 
‘sucking’ smoke finally caught the attention of the authorities who, 
                                                 
1 That is because I want to argue for a biologically-inclined, longer-term view of human societies and 
economies which has something of a Nietzschean flavour insofar as it recognises the fundamental 
ironies of what we call culture, given the limited freedoms of human being. 
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predictably enough, tried to ban it. The Emperor Chongzhen was 
particularly concerned that land used for grain was being turned over to 
tobacco and in 1639 he decreed that anyone caught selling tobacco in 
Beijing would be decapitated. But in 1642 the ban was lifted: it was 
already too late. The habit had caught on, not least amongst the influential 
constituency of soldiers. Smoking had rapidly moved from an exotic 
custom to becoming the habit of large segments of the population, 
surrounded by all manner of paraphernalia and protocols and its own 
economic infrastructure. Indeed, China rapidly took on a reputation for 
being smoking-mad which it more than justified in terms of overall levels 
of consumption and the elaborately performative nature of its smoking 
cultures (Brook, 2008).  
 
Now fast forward to the present and to the other example: the case of 
modern-day financial markets2. Such markets have, of course, been in 
operation for many centuries – indeed, Tarde (1902/2007, p630) 
commented upon them extensively in Economic Psychology, arguing that 
‘the peaks and troughs of values in the stock market, unlike the 
oscillations of a barometer, could not even remotely be explained without 
considering their psychological causes: fits of hope or discouragement in 
the public, the propagation of a good or bad sensational story in the minds 
of speculators’. But their reach and complexity has expanded inordinately 
since Tarde’s time, allowing them undreamt of generative powers that 
precisely follow a logic of ‘mimetic rationality’ (Marazzi, 2008). That 
expansion has taken place for four reasons. First, new socio-technical 
platforms have allowed price-fixing, market-making, and means of 
generating liquidity undreamt of by Tarde. Second, new kinds of complex 
product have become available, based upon these socio-technical 
platforms but with their own powers. Third, new regulatory frameworks 
have forced particular economic behaviours which have ultimately 
proved problematic, such as mark to market. Fourth – and this is the issue 
I want to concentrate on – there has been a powering up of 
communication. As a result of this general tendency, the role of the 
mediated conversation has moved centre stage. Similarly the financial 
media have become actors in their own right and what was largely 
private, or at least conducted behind closed doors, has become largely 
public, as institutions of public intimacy born out of the concatenation of 
performance and the media have become general in the economy as 
dances of calculative affect (Roach, 2007). Enhanced communication has 
allowed what Dawkins called the meme to become something like a 
reality in financial markets, markets which depend upon a pyramid of 
                                                 
2 Equally, I could have used the example of other market forms, for example, housing markets. See 
Smith, Monro and Christie, 2006, Monro and Smith, 2008. 
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promises for their existence and which therefore generate a pervasive and 
probably inescapable degree of uncertainty since ‘chance, ignorance, or 
knavery – in the jargon, uncertainty, adverse selection, or moral hazard – 
can intervene to prevent financing from being repaid’ (Rajan and 
Zingales cited in Wolf, 2009, p13). Following Marazzi (2008), we can 
therefore say that the markets are based on herd behaviour which is 
dependent upon the information deficit3 of individual investors. This herd 
behaviour depends for its momentum on the swash and swirl of affect 
which is both the fuel and the result of the systematic uncertainty created 
by this deficit. This uncertainty allows prices to be continuously made 
and unmade, liquidity to be maintained and profits to be made – until 
market sentiment turns and panic, caused by a ‘flight to safety by 
investors who know they do not know the riskiness of the assets they 
own’ (Wolf, 2009, p25), sets in. As it now has. 
Here, then, are two textbook examples of imitative processes rapidly 
sweeping through populations, one fuelled by a substance with an 
addictive property, tobacco, the other by a series of conversations fuelled 
by hormones reacting within a mediated environment to produce 
something not dissimilar to addictive behaviour. It is Tarde’s work come 
to life in the most graphic kind of way4. Tarde (1902, cited in Hughes, 
1961, p555) was, above all, interested in psychosocial processes of 
imitation, processes that were the result of mind working upon mind, of 
‘mental states acting upon each other’, and the way that these 
‘interspiritual’ states gradually evolved through minute changes without 
necessarily needing the push of any structure. For a long time, Tarde’s 
work fell out of fashion, not least because of its emphasis on process at 
the expense of the substantive results of social interaction5. But now it is 
coming back into favour, fuelled by new work in disciplines as unlike as 
cognitive science, archaeology, primatology, social medicine, and media 
studies in which renewed attention is being given to basic biological 
processes like imitation which do not assume such social intermediaries 
as ‘the development of a self or the possession of a theory of mind’ 
(Turner, 2007, p367). My aim will be to use Tarde’s work to begin to 
construct that missing portion of political economy that might be 
understood as Keynes’s infamous ‘animal spirits’ – contagious spirits like 
confidence, fear, ‘irrational’ exuberance, bad faith, corruption, 
confidence, a sense of fairness, and the very stories we tell ourselves 
                                                 
3 An information deficit which is both general and asymmetric. 
4 Although the flame was carried on in a few niches. So, it is no surprise to find that Tarde has 
continued to have influence on the study of  psycho-social processes like smoking (see). 
5 But it is worth remembering that imitation does not have to be understood as a necessarily bad thing. 
As Brecht (1976) put it; ‘From new transmitters came the old stupidities, Wisdom was passed on from 
mouth to mouth’. 
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about our economic fortunes, with all the push that they encapsulate. The 
global financial crisis has made it painfully clear that these powerful 
psychosocial forces have come to imperil the wealth of nations today, 
whether we consider the overweening confidence of so many consumers 
that house prices could continue to rise indefinitely (Smith, 2008) or 
plummeting trust in the workings of capital markets (Akerlof and Shiller, 
2009). Yet, until recently, only a very few commentators – Mill, Bagehot, 
Pigou, Keynes - have explicitly considered these forces as anything other 
than epiphenomenal to the real business of economy and, even then, they 
are often consigned to what is quite literally a spirit world outside of the 
bounds of normal economic calculation6. Tarde was different. For him, 
there was no concealing ‘under abstractions such as credit, service and 
work, the sensations and feelings underlying them’ (Tarde, 1902/2007, 
p630).  
I will therefore commence the paper by trying to etch the main 
components of mimetic rationality and radiation as we might now 
understand them, with another one hundred years of scientific knowledge 
to hand. That will involve the consideration of four different biological-
cultural moments: imitation and neurological processes of mirroring more 
generally; what might be termed short-term genetic change; what can be 
called the to and fro of hormonal swashes, and; what might be identified 
as the humours that arise from particular kinds of material culture. I will 
then turn to two other aspects of Tarde’s work which can be updated with 
the benefit of historical hindsight, namely the growing importance of 
what I will call ‘premediation’ and how it is possible to understand the 
gradual build-up of small changes into something significant without the 
benefit of a guiding hand. The second part of the paper then moves on to 
consider how aspects of the economy which were considered as without 
the sphere of economic calculation are gradually being brought within 
through the increasing interest of business and economics in things 
biological. I will show how the first glimmerings of this interest are 
turning into an attempt to produce a world in which semiconscious action 
can be put up for sale, so sealing Tarde’s account in practice as well as 
theory. But though my general intention is to show that Tarde is ever 
more relevant to the historical moment, his work cannot just stand as is. 
In the third part of the paper, I therefore want to put three modifications 
of his work into place: small but important mutations, if you like, which 
herald larger changes in how imitative momentum is built, maintained, 
                                                 
6 This state of affairs is now changing. For example, see  Malmendier and Nagel’s famous (2006) study 
of the way in which different generations, with different affective experiences of economic conditions 
through their lives, took a different attitude to risk and saving, even controlling for age, year and 
household characteristics.   
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and channelled arising out of more and more complex processes of 
worlding7. First, there is the matter of the creation of worlds through the 
mass production of phenomenology. Second, there is the matter of the 
construction of doors. Third, there is the matter of the production of more 
active spaces, undergirded by a cinematic mathematics. These 
modifications not only allow us to provide Tarde with a theoretical and 
practical persona better suited to the present but they also provide 
important jumping-off points in their own right, means of understanding 
the diverse currencies of the present. Then the final part of the paper 
provides some brief conclusions on what I call the political economy of 
propensity. 
 
Understanding the Bio-Social Constitution of Human Being 
 
Let me begin this section by addressing the mutual constitution of the 
‘social’ and the ‘biological’. For a long time, the categories of the social 
and the biological have bedevilled rational analysis of human cultures, 
producing no-go zones which are only just beginning to crumble. On the 
one side have stood the guardians of ‘causes understood as ‘social’’ 
(Freese, 2008, pS3), on the other side have stood the guardians of 
biological causes, and ne’er the twain shall meet. Indeed, the two sides 
are often actively opposed to each other. Worse than the obstinacy of the 
distinction has been the ways in which it has disallowed research into 
areas of human experience which can only be explained by appealing 
across the divide: affects like violence, for example, or fear, for example. 
Tarde is interesting precisely because, as a writer who at least 
acknowledged Darwin8, he sought models which would incorporate both 
domains. This he did by privileging ‘conversation’, understood not just as 
a linguistic process but as something much broader taking in gesture and 
other forms of interaction, for ‘if, among the actions from which opinion 
results, one seeks the most general and constant, one perceives easily that 
it is this elementary social relation … which has been most completely 
ignored by sociologists’ (Tarde, 1902, cited in Hughes, 1961, p556)9. 
Key to this great science of communication, in which ‘symbolic networks 
provide a fourth dimension of heredity and evolution’ (Jablonka and 
Lamb, 2005, p201), were models of semiconscious imitation which, by 
                                                 
7 I take this term equally from the work of the Italian operaismo Marxists, particularly Virno, 
Lazzarato, and Marazzi, and from the work of Peter Sloterdijk. Sloterdijk’s phenomenological twist on 
the Italian Marxists revitalized political economy is crucial, as we shall see in a later section. 
8 Some authors describe Tarde as an unabashed Darwinian (e.g. Hodgson, 2006) but this is too simple. 
In fact, he was influenced by Darwinism – but only barely and, in part, based on misunderstandings 
(see Jahoda, 2002, Valsiner and van der Veer, 2000, Williams, 1987). 
9 Of course, in a time after Garfinkel and Goffman, such an insight seems less compelling but it is 
worth remembering that  
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Tarde’s day, already had a long history10, models which could explain the 
dynamics of change. But Tarde was no mere diffusionist. He well 
understood that ‘the needs and labours of men do not simply repeat 
themselves; they are often opposed, and more often adapted. It is on 
condition of being adapted to one another that they succeed in repeating 
themselves’ (Tarde, 1902/2007. p627). In other words, each iterative act 
of imitation was more likely than not to undergo adaptation. Like one of 
his forebears, Ravaisson (1838/2008), Tarde never considered habit as a 
fixed repetition but as a general disposition which permits initiative11. 
 
The importance of models of semiconscious imitation of the kind that 
Tarde espoused has been confirmed by subsequent work in the area of 
what might be called ‘cultural biology’, work which is dependent on the 
discovery of the prominence of short-term and comparatively rapid 
biological change which is clearly connected to and indeed is part and 
parcel of cultural change. Habit, if you like, is gradually laid down as 
biology. This change can be found in four areas which Tarde’s work can 
be seen as prefiguring, each of which I will address in turn. These are 
changes in neurophysiology, in genetic make-up, in hormonal balance, 
and in tool use. Work on such changes already begins to provide 
something of an extension to Tarde’s thinking in its own right. I will then 
continue to update Tarde by considering two other issues, namely the rise 
of what I will call ‘premediation’, the process by which the media have 
tapped into semiconscious processes of imitation and amplified them in 
various ways, and how the gradual build-up of small changes produces 
large changes without there necessarily having to be any large structure to 
contain and guide the process. 
 
Let me begin, then, with habit, understood as both culture and biology. 
My first moment is, not surprisingly, Tarde’s subconscious processes of 
neurophysiological imitation. These processes are now better understood 
than ever before and I will therefore simply reprise the summary I gave 
first in Thrift (2007). We now know that the bulk of what we understand 
as a person is ‘mostly unconscious, or spontaneously and intrinsically 
generated brain activity’ (Stafford, 2008, p4) which is continuously 
active12. Though we may not want to go quite as far as Metzinger (2003, 
                                                 
10 Such as in the work of Erasmus Darwin, William Preyer, James Mark Baldwin, and William James, 
and in therapeutic contexts by Hippolyte Bernheim and Jean-Martin Charcot (Jahoda, 2002). 
11 This tradition can be thought of as having some roots in biology, notably through the work of Bichat 
and its influence on Maine de Biran. 
12 Indeed, recent research suggests that the brain never rests. For example, the brain’s visual centres 
remain active even when eyes are closed or when asleep. One suggestion is that neurons must ‘think’ in 
order to live. Another is that a minimal level of activity allows a ‘quick start’ from rest if there is a 
crisis (see Britt, 2009). 
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p1) in arguing that ‘no such things as selves exist in the world’, only the 
‘shaded surfaces’ of a continuous process of self-modelling (see Thrift, 
2007), still we now realize that we are founded on a neurodynamics 
which is the result of evolutionary developments which mean that we 
experience the world in very particular ways. In particular, we now 
comprehend that human beings are imitative animals – depending on 
what is meant by imitation, of course. Human beings subconsciously 
mirror each other’s actions in a constant iterative ballet of not-quite 
duplication, that rolls what we call society over but which also allows 
room for the vagaries of accident and the necessities of improvisation, 
just as did Aquinas’s original notion of habitus signifying a durable 
characteristic which could therefore become the foundation of virtue 
(Davies, 2002). Imitation takes place through media like conversation and 
gesture but can be boosted and extended by all manner of technologies, 
such as print and now the various new visual media. Thus, what we can 
see is a constant adaptive creep which has its own momentum and cannot 
be catalogued as a social category or force since it is happening 
continuously, as a background of contagion which acts equally as a 
foreground. The contagion includes all manner of psychosocial states. For 
example, recent research (see the summary in Steptoe and Diaz Roux, 
2009) suggests that even a condition like happiness (and, by implication, 
important determinants of health and wellbeing) may be contagious, 
travelling via particular social connections in ways which seem to be 
independent of factors like socioeconomic status.  
 
The importance of imitation has only been underlined by the discovery of 
mirror neurons which fire at the perception of another’s actions – with no 
motor actions involved at all. This discovery confirms this line of 
thinking in the way that it produces a plausible neurophysiological 
explanation for the means by which the existence of the other is etched 
into the brain so that we are able to intuit what the other is thinking – we 
are able to ‘mindread’ - not only because we see others’ emotions but 
because we share them (Rizzolati and Sininaglia, 2008, Iacoboni, 2008). 
Through the template of movements we have built up, which activates 
particular muscles and provides us with particular movement properties, 
we learn not just to identify but to anticipate; ‘our brains are capable of 
mirroring the deepest aspects of the minds of others, even at the fine-
grained level of a single cell’ (Iacoboni, 2008, p34). In other words, to 
see others perform is to perform ourselves: ‘we reciprocally paint our 
affective lives inside one another’ (Stafford, 2008. p76). For example, a 
subset of the cells in our brains fires ‘when an individual kicks a soccer 
ball, hears a ball being kicked, and even just says or hears the word ‘kick’ 
… ’ (Iacoboni, 2008, p12). Perception, cognition and action do not 
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therefore occupy discrete zones. Indeed, such descriptions of behaviour 
are suspect when perception and motor functions occupy the same space. 
In other words, the dictates of phenomenology find a neurophysiological 
anchorage, an insight now being followed up by all manner of 
investigators (see also, for example, Petitot, and Zahavi, 2008). 
 
In turn, imitation is understood as at the root of what it means to be 
human. Moving well beyond the kind of stimulus enhancement routinely 
observed in animals, imitation is revealed as a high-order evolutionary 
construct, not least because it has been shown that mirror cells can 
acquire new properties and therefore can fuel emergent behaviours: what 
fundamentally distinguishes humans from animals is not language but the 
capacity to imitate and this ability to imitate is innate: babies as young as 
41 minutes have been shown to imitate. In other words, imitation 
provides a novel evolutionary pathway for learning. Babies do not learn 
to imitate, they learn by imitating, and imitation is the prelude to and 
facilitator of verbal communication. Indeed, imitation is probably even 
more important than Tarde thought it to be not least because the imitative 
faculty underlies the empathy which human beings feel for each other. In 
other words, imitation is the condition of being human. Put another way;  
 
These [scientific]discoveries transform empathy, taking the attitude 
of the other, and imitation, from a vague and dubious phenomenon 
that can be observed and described but not explained, into 
something that can be explained in terms of brain processes. This 
on the one hand validates them – especially against the scepticism 
of positivists about such things as empathic understanding – but on 
the other hand forces us to ask some serious questions about brain 
processes and about the ways in which our received descriptions of 
phenomenon, such as taking the attitude of the other, do not match 
up with the neuronal evidence (Turner, 2007, p367). 
But there is something else that Tarde did not really foresee. There is no 
reason to think that our imitative faculty will just stand still, not least 
because the human brain is still evolving. Nor can imitation be 
understood as just relying on imitative capacities and capabilities: the rest 
of brain function also needs to be taken into account, not least because the 
most relevant trend in the evolutionary history of Homo sapiens is a rapid 
increase in brain size and complexity and there is no reason to think that 
it is not continuing in present-day humans: after all, as Campbell (2002) 
puts it, there is no reason to think that evolution stops at the neck or that, 
more generally, evolution suddenly ground to a halt when human beings 
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came on the scene – indeed, it may even be that it is speeding up. In other 
words, there is no completed human being13.  
One way of approaching this question of current evolutionary change is 
through genetics (Bearman, 2008); after all, many human characteristics 
which are conventionally regarded as social have been found to have 
substantial genetic heritability (see Table 1 in Freese, 2008). If a gene has 
evolved adaptively in the making of the human species, there seems no 
obvious reason why it will not continue to undergo adaptive evolution 
after the emergence of anatomically modern humans. Indeed, by 
analyzing human polymorphism patterns, some evidence is emerging that 
certain ‘humanness’ genes are experiencing ongoing positive selection in 
humans. Of particular interest are the ASPM and Microcephalin genes. In 
each of these two genes, a new sequence variant has arisen in the recent 
past of human history, and has since swept to exceptionally high 
frequency around the world, presumably due to strong positive selection 
(Linden, 2007). The exact fitness advantage conferred by these new 
variants is not yet known. However, given the highly specific function of 
ASPM and Microcephalin in regulating brain size and also given their 
history of intense adaptive evolution in the lineage leading to Homo 
sapiens, it is not unreasonable to hypothesize that these new variants may 
improve some aspect of brain function. Work is currently underway to 
test this hypothesis (see Hawks, 2008) and the preliminary findings 
suggest the tantalizing possibility that the human brain is still evolving, in 
the sense that it is still undergoing adaptive change, through plodding but 
detectable increases in brain size. 
One thing Tarde did foresee, however, was the importance of fugue. Like 
many of his contemporaries, he was fascinated by states like hypnotic 
trances, sleep, sleepwalking, and night terrors, and all the other ‘spiritual’ 
conditions in which the social vocabulary of agency, inner worlds and 
outer worlds breaks down and is unable to be restored because of the 
prepersonal ‘biological’ nature of such moments (Lee, 2008). Famously, 
Tarde wrote of imitation as though it could be likened to somnambulism, 
and of a resultant somnambulist society. But states of fugue have 
increasingly come back into scientific notice and as they have done so the 
resultant research has thrown down some challenges to Tarde’s account. 
                                                 
13 It might even be the case, as Sloterdijk has argued, that human beings should be thought of as a 
special case of neoteny – in which arrested development has become the mature form. It has already 
been hypothesized that certsin disorders such as infantile epilepsies, dyslexia, Huntingdon’s and 
Alzheimer’s might be born out of neural misconnections taking place at  early developmental stages 
before symptoms appear, and it is a relatively small step from here to the more general thesis. 
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Take the case of sleep. Increasingly, NREM sleep, which, incidentally, is 
the phase of sleep in which sleepwalking occurs, is understood as an 
evolutionary phenomenon, a way of producing enforced inactivity during 
periods when being inactive is the optimal strategy14, as well as reducing 
the requirement for food. NREM sleep is not so much recuperative as a 
mechanism to ensure that animals stay still when they have nothing better 
to do. Such a theory also explains why babies sleep so much: there is not 
much else they can do with their time (Martin, 2003). But REM sleep, a 
universal characteristic of all large-brained animals which makes up 20 to 
25 per cent of sleep in mature human adults (and much more in babies), is 
a very different matter indeed. There the chief function seems to be 
maintaining the brain in some way; the resting body is put to use. There is 
considerable evidence that REM sleep is chiefly concerned with learning, 
and most particularly the consolidation of memory (for example, the 
rehearsing of experiences from earlier in the day), and also with the 
regulation of mood (Linden, 2007). Dreams process the whole of 
cognition, and most especially emotion15, into narratives that allow 
distant associations and insights which would be much more difficult to 
make within the continuous sensory bombardment of everyday life: they 
are ‘faulty’ awakenings (Horne, 2006). In other words, dreams involve 
what might be called ‘worlding’ but as the shaping of a highly selective 
and distorted model of the world in which some elements of reality are 
systematically over-represented while others are under-represented. 
What’s most important about dreaming is that it allows you to 
experience a world where the normal waking rules don’t apply, 
where causality and rational thought and our core cognitive 
schemas (people don’t transform or mrerge, places should be 
constant, gravity always operates, and so forth) melt away in the 
face of bizarre and illogical stories. And, while you dream, you 
accept these stories as they unfold. Essentially the experience of 
narrative dreams allows you to imagine explanations and structures 
that exist outside of your waking perception of the natural world. 
In your waking life you may embrace the distorted structures of the 
dream world or you may be a hard-headed rationalist, or you may 
blend the two (as most of us do), but in all cases the experience of 
dreaming has thrown back the curtain and allowed you to imagine 
a world where fundamentally different rules apply (Linden, 2007, 
p220). 
                                                 
14 Though inactivity is a relative term since human beings move incessantly whilst asleep, changing 
body posture every fifteen or twenty minutes. However, their muscles are near-paralysed during REM 
sleep. 
15 Indeed the regions of the brain that subserve emotion seem to be particularly strongly involved in 
REM sleep, not least because they activate certain hormones. 
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The point is that these REM states are not so much unconscious as 
semiconscious acts of redescription – Tarde’s exact description of much 
of human life. But the model of somnambulism that Tarde adopted as a 
description of semiconsciousness is not a good one, since it suggests 
NREM automata with only a limited repertoire of behaviour. However, 
the example of REM sleep shows that human beings are actually wired to 
produce alternate worlds, to unward rather than toward, as a matter of 
course (Tallis, 2008). The brain can create a ‘virtual reality’ of a kind 
(Hobson, 2002)16. Thus, the language of worlding may well hold at the 
deepest level. 
A second moment follows on, namely short-term genetic change, on the 
same timeframe as cultural change. The evidence for this proposition is 
steadily increasing too. There are, of course, famous cases of the progress 
of genetic adaptive evolution in the historical short term. The case of the 
spread of lactose tolerance comes to mind, a change which happened 
about 8000 years age, sufficiently recently that many populations still do 
not have the gene: one in 50 Swedes, for example, but nine out of 10 
Asian Americans. So does the ambiguous case of the sickle cell trait as a 
response to malaria. But more recent, admittedly controversial, studies 
suggest that up to 10 per cent of the human genome may be evolving at 
the maximum possible rate – far faster than at any other time in history. If 
these studies prove to be accurate, then it may be that ‘we invented 
agriculture, started eating different food, and began dwelling in cities. 
Our numbers swelled, our world changed, and our DNA is still catching 
up’ (Phelan, 2008, p). What seems likely is that changes to environment 
(the change from hunter-gathering to more sedentary existences), to diet 
(the corresponding shift to less diverse food sources), and to the 
susceptibility to disease (occasioned by larger, more concentrated 
populations) have produced new genetic vectors. What would be the most 
interesting finding would be to show that intelligence is still being 
selected for. There are some studies that very tentatively seem to suggest 
that this may be so. Others suggest that qualities like emotionality are still 
evolving. What does seem certain is that ‘culture is not an escape from 
conditioning environments. It is an environment of a different kind’ 
(Phelan, 2008, p). Once the brain gets to a certain level, it permits an 
explosion of cultures which in turn condition the brain. Perhaps we can 
evolve into our successors before we destroy ourselves – or perhaps not. 
                                                 
16 But, as Hobson (2007) points out, the structure of this reality still eludes us. Is it based on narrative, 
or is that simply how dreams tend to be reported by awake respondents? Is it based on logic and 
associated detail or, more likely, hyperassociativity and emotional salience? And so on. 
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A third moment is in the history of brain-body chemistry and especially 
the interaction between hormones, psychotropic mechanisms17, and 
material cultures. After all, in everyday life we are constantly altering our 
brain-body chemistry. This is the neurohistorical vision that Daniel Smail 
(2008, pp 157-158) has recently conjured up.   
In everyday life, we do many things that alter our moods and 
feelings on a regular basis. These alterations are reflected in 
constantly changing levels of chemical messengers in our tissues 
and in our brains. In principle, an omniscient observer of human 
moods should be able to track these changes, like a technician in a 
recording studio facing an array of dancing meters. Each meter on 
the board would register a different neurochemical: serotonin, 
dopamine, all the androgens and oestrogens, and dozens of others 
besides. Most bars, as they rise and fall, would follow a fairly slow 
rhythm, measured on the order of hours, days, or even weeks. A 
few, such as those registering epinephrine, norepinephrine, or 
corticotrophin-releasing hormone, would occasionally show rapid 
spikes and dips, corresponding to the sudden shocks or flashes of 
rage we experience from time to time. With enough study, patterns 
would emerge: of the Wall Street trader, say, whose testosterone 
takes a beating in a bear market and is restored by visits to sex 
shops. Of the teenager, whose frenetic spikes and dips show as 
much variation in a week as an older and wiser person would 
experience in several months. Of whole groups whose levels of 
dopamine or serotonin, averaged across a month, are distinctly 
higher than those of other, more favoured groups. Studies like this 
might show, in fact have shown, how social privilege, a product of 
cultural patterns and historical trends, correlates strongly with 
levels of stress hormones. 
The array of meters might also reveal how the neurotransmitters 
and hormones present in our bodies, in theory, could unite to 
produce an infinite range of different moods and feelings. As a 
practical matter, however, we soon learn to recognise the 
familiarity of certain combinations, certain chords, both in 
ourselves and in others. Our cultures have found it convenient to 
assign names to these common chords: joy, depression, sadness, 
anticipation. Your moods and feelings may be tinted with a slightly 
different range of combinations than mine, and we gossip about the 
variations so as to calibrate our mood-descriptions more closely to 
                                                 
17 In Smail’s (2008) usage, these mechanisms encompass all kinds of objects, practices and institutions 
which have similar neurochemical effects to those produced by psychotropic or psychoactive drugs. 
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the feelings we actually have. In some cases, we may find that we 
have nothing to share whatever, and that is where we reach the 
limits of empathy. Our bodies, by virtue of the genomes they carry, 
are capable of providing us with a whole palette of sounds. But it is 
our own life histories, the variations between the alleles we carry, 
and, perhaps above all, the cultures we live in that write the actual 
music. 
In other words, history can be seen as the swash of hormones which 
constantly operate on what are remarkably plastic brain synapses through 
the medium of cultural amplifiers like caffeine, sentimental novels, 
pornographic works, and all manner of consumer goods. Thus Smail 
writes of the constant generation of neurophysiological ecosystems as ‘a 
field of evolutionary adaptation in which the sorts of customs and habits 
that generate new neural configurations or alter brain-body states could 
evolve in unpredictable ways’ (p155). Like Hawks, Smail cites the 
extreme changes that took place in the Neolithic – the expansion in 
calories available for human consumption, the domestication of animals, 
new more sedentary lifestyles, and the growing density of human 
settlement, as central to the contemporary ecosystem. But equally, he is 
willing to countenance all kinds of other shorter-run biological-cultural 
ecosystems, each with their own hormonal ways of going on. For 
example, in the passage above, he points to the financial markets as being 
awash with hormones. Indeed, recent research suggests that there is 
something in this: the waves of irrational exuberance and pessimism that 
routinely destabilize the markets may be driven by naturally produced 
steroid hormones which have mildly addictive effects. With receptors in 
almost every nucleated cell of the body, steroids like testosterone and 
cortisol affect the behaviour displayed in risk-taking situations. Thus, 
Coates and Herbert (2007) found that a male trader’s cortisol rises with 
both the variance of his trading results and the volatility of the market. 
They suggest that higher testosterone levels may contribute to economic 
return whilst cortisol is increased by risk. Elevated levels of steroids may 
even shift risk preferences18. 
A fourth moment lies in material culture which now becomes 
something akin to an all-enveloping miasma as technological objects 
are no longer just tools but means of grounding (Tresch, 2007). 
Whereas the mainstream approach to cognition holds that it happens in 
                                                 
18 In another paper, Coates, Gurnell and Ristichini, (2008) suggest that high levels of prenatal 
androgens, as measured by the second to fourth digit ratio,  may produce more successful traders, given 
that prenatal androgens increase risk preferences andpromote more rapid visuometer scanning and 
physical reflexes. 
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the brain and that material culture is nothing more than an outgrowth 
of the brain’s mental capacity, most material culture approaches now 
posit an extended and distributed mind, in which material culture is not 
a reflection of the human mind but a part of it’s functioning: ‘objects 
also make the mind’, laying ‘down tracks that affectively activate our 
eyes and mind … [and] …stamp us with the marks and textures of the 
phenomenal world’ (Stafford, 2008, p9, p11). Think, for example, of 
the interaction between hand, brain and object in which evolution has 
responded to the environment by producing a more and more complex 
brain architecture which can cope with reaching out and grasping what 
is to hand, and has coevally produced more and more complex models 
of the hand which can form brain and world in myriad ways (Thrift, 
2007). It follows that, if material culture is an extension of human 
cognition, then it has actively shaped the evolution of human 
intelligence. Tarde, being interested in ‘inter-spiritual’ contagion, 
tended to neglect the influence of the technical environment as a 
crucial determinant of cognition. Take the case of the media. It is true 
that Tarde well understood the importance of the print media of the 
time as a determinant of contagion. But subsequent developments have 
made the importance of the media much clearer. That development has 
taken place on a number of levels, all of them precipitated by the 
internet to a greater or lesser extent. The first is the identification of 
populations. Indeed, the spread of the internet has produced both a new 
medium and a means of getting much closer to what Tarde was trying 
to study (Latour, 2007) through developments such as 
geodemographics, geographical information systems, and data mining. 
The second development results from the fact that these new forms of 
demographic have also produced means of reflecting on medium and 
message in a concerted manner from everyday metrics like hits, 
through social networking sites to the ubiquitous website and blog - 
with clear and obvious consequences, not least for participants and 
organizations who are increasingly able to see and measure their own 
influence. Thus, a new source of reflexivity has become available. The 
third development has been the addition of locative technologies 
allowing both data acquisition and reflexivity to move with the agent, 
producing all kinds of new possibilities (Thrift, 2008). In turn, and in 
aggregate, these three developments have produced an enhanced power 
to propagate psychosocial forces. Kellaway (2009) points to precisely 
this quality when she discusses the current recession; 
 
This is our first experience of recession in the internet age … 
You could say that the internet makes the recession more 
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bearable as there are all those networks to help people get jobs 
and there is Ebay for buying things second-hand. 
Yet such things are trivial compared to what the internet is doing 
to our confidence. The internet has created a global psyche. The 
web has mentally joined us at the hip, so we can no longer put 
our heads in the sand … 
Through blogs, websites and e-mails the world’s economic ills 
are fed to us on a drip all day long. It is not just that we hear 
about bad things faster, we hear about more of them and in a 
more immediate way. My worries become yours and yours 
become mine. On the internet, a trouble shared is not a trouble 
halved. It is a trouble needlessly multiplied all over the world … 
This would not matter so much if it were not for the fact that 
confidence is the medicine that cures the recession: and all this 
sharing of bad news leaves one with no confidence at all. 
If I had been alive during the last comparable recession, over 60 
years ago, I would nave limited my news injection to reading 
The Times front page every morning. In those days it had a front 
page given over not to big scary headlines, but to small 
classified ads. The news inside would probably have left me a 
little depressed over breakfast, but I would have had the rest of 
the day to recover my equanimity (Kellaway, 2009, p12).  
 
The point is that something like memetics has become a practical 
possibility as communication systems have broadened and deepened. The 
language of memes, one of those terms that says both something and 
nothing, has not been a good one, I think. It has flattened analysis by 
positing a cultural equivalent of a genetic engine in ways which Tarde 
would never have allowed (Jahoda, 2002). It may be marginally useful as 
an expression of what is attempting to come into existence. But, no more 
than that. There is, in any case, an alternative – one that arises from 
within the study of the media. Niklas Luhmann was known for his study 
of communication, But he also applied this interest, notably in his 
Zettelkasten system, an index card reference system which was used to 
map out ideas, thoughts and theories. The Zettelkasten system allowed 
Luhmann to think about society as a system of communication rather than 
individuals or actions, and as a series of multiple, independent and 
parallel subsystems dividing in non-linear and non-hierarchical ways. In 
effect, Luhmann had invented hypertext of the kind now found 
structuring the world wide web, in which no text is more important than 
any other, and the entries refer to each other by links. From this 
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experience, Luhmann fashioned an autopoietic19 theory of 
communication which replaced the delicious certainty of the notion of 
goal-oriented action with something closer to the reference system of 
poetry, in which the system ‘gives itself priority over all external 
reference, but only to make itself seem ambiguous’ (Luhmann, 1998, 
p21). Such systems provide a practical means by which memes can 
spread since there are no barriers of hierarchy to constrain them. 
  
To summarize, culture is gradually biologically aggregated and 
embedded at a series of temporal scales. The process of aggregation and 
embedding can be short-term as in the to and fro of imitative rays and 
their accompanying hormonal reactions. It can be longer-term as in 
practices which bring various cultural actions together which, if taught 
over a long period, can produce neural grooves in the brain as a normal 
part of development. It can be longer-term again, as in the invention of 
new pharmacopeias like those that came together in eighteenth century 
Europe or drastic material re-arrangements like agriculture (Smail, 2008). 
And it can be very long-term, as in the interaction between the structure 
of the brain, and the body more generally, and genes. But note that, in 
each case, the interaction between what was formerly termed the 
biological and the social is often all but immediate, given the time frame 
within which particular biological processes work. 
 
Indeed, we can now see the way in which particular economies can have 
biological effects in what, in evolutionary terms, is short order. Take just 
the period after speciation and the longest-term of these biological 
processes – the interaction between culture and genes. Thus the great 
settlement of the Neolithic is now being inscribed in our bodies at the 
genetic scale. Our bodies are being born with its sedentarist genetic 
imprint (Gamble, 2007, Renfrew, 2008). The great age of globalization is 
likely to achieve something similar because of the unparalleled degree of 
genetic mixing in large populations, though these effects are unlikely to 
                                                 
19 Of course, the term was originally coined by Maturana and Varela to describe biological systems and 
was transferred to the social domain. To whit, ‘an autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined 
as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components 
which: (i) through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the 
network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete 
unity in space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its 
realization as such a network’. Thus, ‘ … the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained 
and cannot be described by using dimensions that define another space. When we refer to our 
interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, however, we project this system on the space of our 
manipulations and make a description of this projection’. (Maturana and Varela, 1973/1980, p78, p. 
89). 
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be seen and felt for many hundreds of years (Bayart, 2007). Finally, the 
imprint of the economies of the present is registering in our bodies in all 
kinds of ways and may well in time provide genetic shortcuts as a 
saleable commodity. But, more generally and as this example shows, it is 
possible that material culture is often acting as a surrogate for genetic 
change. Changes that would have taken place biologically are now taking 
place through technical means. 
 
I will now move to my second aspect: it has become increasingly clear 
that subconscious processes of imitation can be directed, most 
particularly by processes of what might be called ‘premediation’. Tarde 
pointed to the power of imitative processes in the mediated environments 
he recognised at the time, such as newspapers and markets. but too often 
he tended to see these mediated processes as spreading like wildfire, like 
mobs all but out of control, or as currents pushing up against each other 
in a fluid dynamics in which ascendancy could be all but accidental. 
However, there are numerous examples of ways in which imitative 
processes can be consciously and carefully steered. One on which 
considerable work has been carried out is democracy as it is practiced in a 
media age (Thrift, 2007). Here we find that getting people to vote in 
particular ways through the appliance of mediated narrative framings 
which have taken on their own force has become something much closer 
to a science than an art. For example, Lakoff (2008) argues that modern 
political consultants now understand enough of the dynamics of imitative 
processes and brain-body chemistry to be able to make reasonably 
predictable interventions in the political unconscious of the democratic 
political process. They can construct ‘neural bindings’ which frame 
events in particular ways, narratives of national life that work as part of 
the unconscious as biases to understand the world in particular ways, and 
to be susceptible to that call on them20. The result is that it is possible to 
tug on the behaviour of voters by transferring these narratives into the 
political domain as forms of habitual response which the individual voter 
is plainly susceptible to. For example, the narrative of celebrity, which 
has been a staple of many popular cultures since at least the beginning of 
the twentieth century, and no doubt before, is transferred into politics, 
producing responses which arise out of a potent combination of 
technology and genre, imitation and hormone. 
 
One way in which we can approach these kinds of developments in 
simultaneous measurement and influence through Tarde’s own writings 
in Economic Psychology on ‘glory’. For Tarde (1902/ 2007, p618. p619), 
                                                 
20 It is no surprise that the new neuromarketing techniques are finding favour with political consultants. 
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not only can we think of a division of labour and a division of riches but 
also of a division of glories; ‘an ever-growing multiplicity and difference 
of celebrities and notorieties’ buoyed up by persistent media attention21. 
What counts as glory will vary from culture to culture, of course. The 
accent might be on the doings of musicians or merchants – or both. But 
what is clear is that ‘the most intoxicating glory began as the fanatical, 
impassioned and devoted admiration of a small group of partisans, of 
acolytes gathered in a narrow chapel; it ended up as the relatively cold – 
and never truly devoted – acclamation of a dispersed and immense public, 
which does not know its hero personally’. In turn, such musings can be 
understood as part of a more general process of what Agamben (2007) 
calls ‘glorification’, a process which has religious overtones and which 
can be seen flowing over into the economy. Thus Agamben argues that 
the word oikonomia is itself religious in origin and that a providential 
understanding of the economy still continues, albeit honoured in the 
breach. The trace of a theologically-founded ordering of the world can 
still be detected even though the expansion and intensification of 
capitalism has become an autopoietic mechanism with no soul, no 
sovereign, no law. Without having to subscribe to all of Agamben’s 
theses, it is worth thinking about how the feverish work of glorification of 
a non-existent deity has continued in the economy, even as the economy 
seems to become ever more technical, through the use of the media as 
both ceremonial and liturgical builders of reality: ‘If the role of the media 
is so important in modern democracies, it is not only because they allow 
[us] to control and to govern public opinion, but also because they 
administer and dispense Glory: that doxa, that acclamatory element of 
power, that seems to have disappeared in modern times’ (Agamben, 
2007, p11). In other words, the economy can have all kinds of richness 
inserted in it by these media ferrymen, and many of these will operate at 
the semiconscious or unconscious level. Indeed, Tarde thought that it 
would be possible to develop a ‘gloriometer’ that would be able to 
measure admiration and notoriety (Hughes, 1961), using techniques not 
so far removed from the kinds of network analyses now routinely 
performed on the web. 
 
A third aspect is simply the importance of small changes which 
cumulatively produce large changes, on the model of evolution. 
Famously, Tarde wanted to set up experiments in which he and a network 
of correspondents would trace out these small changes, bit by bit (Barry 
and Thrift, 2007), showing the way that they produced an emergent drift 
in particular directions without there being any centrally located, 
                                                 
21 We might, at least in part,  link this narrative to Weber’s account of charisma, noting that Weber did 
not think that charisma could be fully understood without reference to biology. 
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controlling agency. This thinking has migrated into modern social 
thought as a virtual dimension. Here is Deleuze, drawing on Tarde. 
 
The actualisation of the virtual … always takes place by difference, 
divergence or differentiation. Actualisation breaks with 
resemblance no less than it does with identity as a principle. Actual 
terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate. In this sense, 
actualisation or differentiation is always a genuine creation. It does 
not result from any pre-existing possibility (Deleuze, 1994, pp178-
179). 
 
Although this kind of vision has often been seen as unusual, even bizarre, 
in cultures like those of the West which depend on abstract modelling of 
ideals which are then applied as goals, it is the kind of view of social 
change which has been shared by a number of cultures. Take the culture 
of classical China. François Jullien (2009) has argued that this culture 
followed a quite different course, one which stressed responding to the 
vagaries of the situation as constituting an art of living in itself. In such 
an art, the trick is to detect favourable factors in a situation which allows 
the agent to be carried forwards. The agent keys into the momentum of 
the situation and surfs its possibilities. The agent is not surrounded by a 
situation which (s)he attempts to control but, rather, weaves in and out of 
it, detecting factors that display promise and putting them to work, 
exploiting them as they become available, accepting the situation when 
they are not. Each situation has a potential which can be harvested: the 
‘aim’ of Western styles of thought is dispersed and replaced by 
something much more diffuse and silent which is never completed but 
forms part of an endless tactical adjustment. This is the logic of 
propensity rather than purpose and it seems to me to fit this strand of 
Tarde’s work much more exactly. The idea is to conform to propensity 
and support it, not to guide but to ‘second’: as Laoxi puts it, to ‘help what 
comes of its own doing’. This is not, it needs to be stressed, either non-
action or passivity. Rather, it is the work of aiding and abetting certain 
aspects of continual transformation, strategically bending process so that 
it ‘ripens’ in certain directions rather than others (Jullien, 2009). 
 
Capitalism Tracks Tarde 
 
The preceding section has been a report back from the academic world. 
But what is interesting is how these developments are being replicated in 
the world of business and economics, sometimes using exactly the same 
inspirations for fuel. Let us examine some of the developments aimed at 
maximising ‘mindshare’ by inducing particular habits of buying, but with 
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one caveat. These developments are at an early stage. They usually come 
laden with hyperbole in the manner of many management books. But that 
is no reason to believe that they can therefore have no grip. Behind the 
hyperbole, a series of practical experiments continue to allow this kind of 
thinking to inch forward and to begin to produce prescriptions that work, 
not least, of course, because they begin to change how the world is 
thought to turn up – through a combination of rhetoric, new technologies 
and practical short-cuts – all against a background of a capitalism which 
is increasingly rooted in the exercise of biopower and of populations 
through which discourses circulate which are increasingly medicalised, 
partly as a result of capitalism’s ‘biologisation’ (Esposito, 2008). Indeed, 
in Economic Psychology, Tarde can be seen as prophesying their arrival 
when he argues that; 
 
The tendency to mathematize economic science and the tendency 
to psychologise it, far from being irreconcilables, ought rather, in 
my view, to support each other. In a statistics, reformed and better 
understood – in a statistics penetrated by interpsychological spirit, I 
see a possible and even an easy conciliation of these two 
apparently divergent tendencies (Tarde, 1902 cited in Hughes, 
1961, p558). 
 
Three developments are producing what might be termed a ‘capitalist 
meteorology’, an atmospherics dependent upon unpacking what might be 
called the simple mechanics of sociality, a mechanics which operates at 
the intersection between the biological and the cultural, understanding 
that the basic building blocks of sociality are genetically encoded  and 
neurally etched (for example, certain facial expressions formative of 
strong emotions do seem to be genetically inbuilt) but that these building 
blocks are still open to all kinds of operation. Primed by all the work on 
social networks in business throughout the 1990s and into the early 
2000s, by the work on ‘sensory brands’ and allied work on brands as 
emotional touchstones in the 2000s, as well as all the work on redefining 
work both to make it more satisfying and to harness the potential of the 
whole of the body which dates from at least the 1950s but has undergone 
a renaissance in recent years, this variant of capitalism has now turned to 
cognitive science in particular, and biology in general, for further 
inspiration with the firm intent of producing what Lindstrom (2008, p6), 
with tongue only partially in cheek, calls ‘buy-ology’ - ‘the key to truly 
and completely understanding the thoughts, feelings, motivations, needs, 
and desires of consumers, of all of us’. And this is not an insignificant 
problem for business – after all, eight out of ten product launches in the 
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United States fail, even more in countries like Japan. Put another way, 
business is intent on the construction of gloriometers. 
 
The first of these developments is the rise of what might be termed neuro-
marketing. Here the intention is clearly to sell more goods by using the 
latest techniques and technologies of cognitive science. Focus groups, 
surveys, and the like, are replaced by experimental techniques from 
cognitive science such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 
functional diffuse optical tomography, and magneto-encephalography 
(MEG) in order to trace out correlations between brain activity and 
propensity to buy. Notwithstanding caveats and cautions (see Zaltman, 
2008), and (brief) moments of ethical awareness, the aim is clear: to 
‘unlock the innermost secrets of the consumer’s mind’ (The Economist, 
2008, p109)22 and this development has already led to the use of ‘decoy 
items’ and other means of making the consumer happier in stores and 
therefore more likely to make a purchase. Although in its infancy, the 
literature on reading (and, more to the point, reengineering) the mind of 
the market has produced some interesting results: for example; fragrance 
and sound produce more powerful reactions than brand logos and brands 
associated with fragrance and sound can produce very powerful reactions, 
strong brand icons code for the selfsame areas of the brain as religious 
experience, brands must play an integral part in the narratives of 
television programmes, that is they are only effective if a credible part of 
the world is being conjured up, images associated with cigarette brands 
may produce more craving than the brands themselves,  many anti-
cigarette warnings actually seem to stimulate smoking, objects like i-pods 
can be designed to simulate mimetic rays, smiling faces really do sell 
goods, subliminal advertising does work, the most effective advertising 
tries to initiate small social rituals, and so on (Lindstrom, 2008, Zaltman, 
2008). The trick has now become to understand how specific neural and 
endocrine agents interact, for example, how mirror neurons and dopamine 
(one of the most addictive brain chemicals) affect self-perception and 
socially held emotions, and, in turn, produce greater susceptibility. The 
talk is not just of sensory branding but of worlding. The intent is, by 
means of selection and integration, to operate in the semiconscious 
domain. The goal is profit. 
 
The second development is the study of imitation, particularly through 
technologies that recognise faces and gestures. Using image recognition 
software, the study of footage from cameras can be analysed in order to 
track the unconscious emotional reactions of consumers. Cues from the 
                                                 
22 In fact, these techniques are already being used in other domains, most notably in politics and the 
media. 
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face and gesture are becoming much more easily read for ‘honest signals’ 
that facilitate this tracking. I have already considered the face in other 
papers (Thrift, 2007, 2008). Here I will look at gesture and body 
movement cues more generally. Consistency is increasing all the time in 
the analysis of gesture and body movement: ‘we need to look for signals 
that are processed unconsciously, or that are otherwise uncontrollable, 
before we can count them as honest’ (Pentland, 2008, p4). Historically 
akin to the physiognomic systems of the eighteenth century, these short-
cut signals are usually counted as of four kinds, each of which 
corresponds to a distinct brain function: influence, the degree of influence 
one person has over another, usually measured by the extent to which one 
person’s speech or bodily activity pattern becomes entrained to the 
other’s (attention and ordering systems); mimicry, the extent to which 
one person copies another during an interaction, measured by, for 
example, nodding heads (cortical mirror neurons); activity, where 
increased activity is usually a sign of interest and excitement, measured 
by activity levels (autonomic nervous system), and; consistency of 
emphasis and timing, where many different thoughts and emotions 
usually leads to movements becoming jerky and uneven, as measured by 
bodily movement (integration of action sequence control). Tiny temporal 
and spatial differences, which are now measurable, can predict and 
influence future behaviour23. For example, imitation of an agent very 
often leads to feelings of trust which means that the agent is likely to 
imitate them in a loop of ‘self-inflicted brainwashing’ which many 
businesses are feeling more and more confident that they can set up. 
These effects can be extraordinarily simple: ‘when experimenters ask 
people to move their heads up and down while listening to a sales pitch or 
seeing a consumer product, the people end up liking the pitch or product 
more, and they are more likely to buy it’ (Pentland, 2008, p41).  
 
The third development is the greater and greater understanding of 
hormonal swashes and how to influence them through the media. This 
dimension is probably the most advanced in that it has been a dream of 
business at least since the 1950s. The intent is clear – to identify 
susceptible populations and to render them open to suggestion. That 
involves a series of techniques which allow the susceptibility of 
populations to be described and worked upon. To begin with, 
contemporary information technology allows populations to be gathered 
up and monitored in ways heretofore impossible, for example, through 
                                                 
23 Pentland (2008, p41) claims that about 40 per cent of variation in behaviour can be predicted by 
social signalling, regardless of what words are used or the array of personal attributes. ‘To put this in 
context, that is the same as the percentage of personal characteristics that can be attributed to your 
genetic make-up’. 
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emotional stance, with the result that it increasingly becomes possible to 
track mimetic rays. The rise of analytics premised on the mining of very 
large and continuously updated data sets allows ‘prediction competition’ 
to become general (Ayres, 2008, Davenport and Harris, 2008)  Then, 
through the internet and various mobile technologies, it becomes possible 
to rapidly feed information and recommendations to these populations, 
producing a means of trading on those susceptibilities that have been 
identified. Finally, it also becomes possible to enter in to something like 
an individualized dialogue with members of these populations, so that 
they feed back their reactions, both producing more information on their 
susceptibilities, and new triggers. In extremis, they may well produce 
their own new and innovative variants which can themselves become the 
basis of new business. In other words, an era of permanent survey of 
populations replaces the fractured surveys of ‘samples’ that used to be 
king (Savage and Burrows, 2007), survey which is active, able to initiate, 
modulate, even pre-empt. 
 
These kinds of developments in the wild go hand-in-hand with 
developments in the academic world. Indeed, the links seem to have 
become ever closer. Consider first the case of sociology and the career of 
Duncan Watts, a quantitative sociologist of networks who became well-
known through his book, Six Degrees. The Science of the Connected 
Age. Several degrees removed, Watts’s work on social influence and 
contagion bears some relation to Tarde’s work and it has been influential 
in business as well as academe. Indeed, in 2007, Watts moved to Yahoo 
as a Principal Research Scientist, working on the determinants of success 
in cultural markets24. Then take the related case of Marc Davis, a UC 
Berkeley computer scientist-cum-literary theorist who since 2006 has also 
worked for Yahoo. His brief has been to design networks that use mobile 
media metadata to achieve breakthroughs in context-aware face and place 
recognition, so producing maps which are simultaneously social networks 
in that they represent where, when, and by whom data is created, shared, 
and recombined (Davis, 2008).  
 
But, not surprisingly, it is economics that has become the best barometer 
of interchange. Thus, the rise of behavioural economics – the marriage of 
economics with the procedures of experimental psychology - since the 
1990s and before has been meteoric and threatens to convert economics 
into a ‘romantic economics’ (Bronk, 2009, p297) which insists that only 
by employing ‘many (more or less) systematic forms of analysis … can 
we hope to capture the multivalence of socio-economic reality’. In turn 
                                                 
24 I am indebted to David Stark for this example. 
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that rise has primed the ground for the ascent of neuroeconomics: ‘the 
biological science of making choices’ (Politser, 2008, p3). 
Neuroeconomics holds out the prospect of using knowledge of the brain 
to rework microeconomic theory, and it recognises the full range of 
human abilities and constraints in this domain, including feelings. This 
field has already reached a second generation of research, one in which 
much more sophisticated experimental techniques (single neuron 
recordings, functional magnetic resonance imaging, 
magnetoencelography, evoked signals in the electroencephalogram, 
positron emission tomography, measures of biochemical metabolites, 
etc.) are combined with more sophisticated models and experimental 
procedures which can interrogate many different kinds of populations. Of 
course, it would be foolish to say that, as yet, neuroeconomics constitutes 
a coherent body of knowledge, not least because of the sheer 
heterogeneity of subjects, models, definitions, measures and tasks to be 
found in the literature and the undoubted difficulty of matching specific 
neural circuits to particular neuroeconomic parameters. Equally, there is 
no such thing as a neuroepidemiology of decision-making which searches 
out different kinds of efficacy. And the study of non-monetary outcomes, 
especially those that stimulate strong feelings, is still in its infancy. All 
that said, it is also clear that such a field will gradually come into 
existence as neural and economic correlations and explanations move 
together and are shown to be, at the very least, plausible. This plausibility 
will only be spurred on by neuroeconomics’ performativity, which is now 
becoming considerable (Mackenzie, 2008), as part of a more general 
move in economics towards intervention in the design of markets and 
institutions which might be thought of as ‘economic engineering’ (Guala, 
2007). This performativity takes two forms. First, it produces a set of 
experimental sites – laboratories if you like - in which the new can be 
simultaneously born and demonstrated: fMRI imaging suites, for 
example. This experimental moment is important in its own right, not 
least because it can be seen as heralding a much wider turn in the 
protocols of the human sciences in data-rich environments (Lury and, 
2009), as well as intersecting with a cultural inflection which is closer to 
the notion of propensity found in non-Western cultures (Lash, 2009). 
Second, it produces new rhetorics which are gradually convincing more 
and more actors and institutions. In this case, neuroeconomics is a sign of 
new norms shaping economic action, norms which are remaking the 
world in their image. The formal institutions and procedures of 
economics interact with economics in the wild to produce a new 
landscape, one which, if anything, is becoming closer to Tarde’s vision, 
not farther away (Callon, 2007). 
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Reworking Tarde 
 
Given these thoughts on the ways in which capitalism is increasingly 
concerned with propensity, what might we do that would extend and 
enrich Tarde’s view of a universe of imitative currents? I want to suggest 
three related avenues of enquiry that it might make sense to follow, all of 
them related to the spaces produced by more and more sophisticated 
processes of worlding. They can be called worlds, doors and stages. 
 
Worlds. The first avenue is the purposeful construction of a 
meteorological ‘flock and flow’ (McCracken, 2006) economy of imitative 
rays. Such an economy requires considerable technical infrastructure, 
whether the flows be of financial concerns or consumer enthusiasms. 
Until recently, this infrastructure was seen as mere technical mediation. 
But it is becoming clear that something much more thoroughgoing is 
occurring. That is the creation of so-called neurophenomenological 
worlds through a combination of phenomenology, experimental brain 
science, new forms of date (including knowledges of spatial disposition) 
and new kinds of mathematical symbolisms (most notably those born out 
of systems theory and algorithmic structures more generally)  (see Petitot, 
Varela, Pachoud and Roy, 1999, Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). These 
worlds are exactly designed to chime with the findings of cognitive 
science but against a phenomenological backdrop. Using the new internet 
and locative technologies that have become available, and associated 
practical and theoretical knowledges of disposition which have 
accumulated and become more systematic over time, a science of 
‘placing’ is therefore coming into existence. This science mixes the 
virtual and physical such that it becomes possible to create something like 
the all-at-onceness of phenomenological worlds on a temporary basis in 
something like a predictable way. 
 
Neurophenomenology has arisen out of developments in phenomenology 
which are instructive, both as new sources of knowledge and as keys to 
the kinds of ambitions that are now unfolding which involve a showdown 
with both metaphysical, absolute realism and the naïve objectivism of 
scientism, a showdown which is a means of making it possible to ‘buy 
realism’; ‘not an illustrative realism, but a realism that comes about 
through a real invention of a new way to lock reality into something 
completely arbitrary’ (Bacon in Sylvester, 1987, p179). Gallagher and 
Zahavi (2008) point to three of the developments which make a this-
worldly stance possible. First, there is a general interest in phenomenal 
consciousness, based in a coalition of psychologists and philosophers. 
Second, there is the advent of embodied approaches to cognition, drawing 
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especially on the work of Merleau-Ponty but also making obeisance to 
the work of writers like Varela, Clark, and Dreyfus. Third, there is the 
rise of neuroscience and the experimental technologies that typify it. The 
point is this. To the extent that phenomenology was ever introspectionist, 
under the spell of cognitive science it has now gone out into the world 
and has become something closer to a technology as it has become ‘more 
problem-oriented’ (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008, p220)25. Famously, 
phenomenology was the science of the way things are experienced as an 
‘all-at-onceness’ and we might see the general aim of this new 
technology as to intervene in experience, not just by adding in or altering 
elements (what might be called the product placement strategy) but 
actually by changing how people experience the world, that is the very 
sensory and perceptual pathways on which they rely (the so-called front-
loading strategy). That means intervening at a whole set of levels at once. 
It means intervening in the intentionality of experience (to use the key 
phenomenological term first deployed by Brentano), the about or of 
something that all experiences conform to, by understanding which 
objects are related to and why. It means intervening in temporal structure, 
and especially in structures of anticipation, most especially through 
premediation. It means cultivating the ability to change what is focussed 
on by intervening directly in perception, especially by considering 
proprioception. It means understanding the phenomenal state of the 
perceiver, through imitative mindreading, apparatuses which have now 
received all manner of prosthetic extension. And so on. 
 
Our knowledge of each of these elements of propensity has become more 
acute. Premediation has already been discussed elsewhere in the paper. It 
is now a major industry. Understanding proprioception has equally 
become a major industry. Fuelled by the dictates of security, reading 
‘honest signals’ has equally become a substantial industry, whether that 
reading takes the form of facial recognition, detection of gesture, or all 
the other ways in which influence, imitation, activity, and consistency can 
be picked up, analyzed and worked with. Then, mindreading has become 
easier, partly because of the previous developments and partly because of 
the sheer amount of reflexivity that now exists. All kinds of feedback 
have become possible which, in turn, make it easier: to not only read but 
produce such features as structures of anticipation; to not only seek out 
but produce like minds; to not only understand (at least in a preliminary 
way) the work of mirroring but to engage in it.  
 
                                                 
25 We should not go too far. As Gallagher and Zahavi (2008, p221) also argue’ although it might be 
argued that phenomenology should pay attention to empirical findings, this doesn’t entail that it should 
accept the (metaphysical and epistemological) interpretation that science gives of these findings’. 
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But the phenomenological take also needs to be extended out from the 
lived body to what might be called nonorganic life. The creation of 
worlds also requires material substrates which act as more than context, 
both because they have their own independent existence and force and 
because they too exist in time and continually change their nature. 
Developments in information technology, materials, and algorithmic 
thinking are allowing these active substrates to come into existence, both 
producing and allowing calls to be heard. For example, whereas once 
there was brainstorming and bodystorming, now there is place storming 
using methods like charettes and iterative engineering, aligned to extreme 
programming, that encourages the amalgamation of humans and materials 
so as to produce different prospects (Ladly and Beesley, 2008, Thrift, 
2009). 
 
Doors. The second avenue consists of the way in which new kinds of 
door can be opened to mimetic flows. To consider this topic, I want to 
turn first to an unlikely source of inspiration: the life and poetry of Emily 
Dickinson. Dickinson wanted to control the space around her in an almost 
obsessive fashion. The world becomes a compartmentalized and 
consecrated domestic dwelling, a geography of interiority, in which she 
could reign; ‘the more limited the space, the more unlimited the speaker’ 
(Fuss 2004, p59). In her life, the domestic interior became a means of 
producing distance through a kind of enforced intimacy/not-intimacy of 
‘meeting apart’ and of ‘exposed hiding’ (Fuss, 2004). And to this careful 
isolation the door was key; open, closed or ajar the door produced a 
carefully choreographed dynamic of intimacy that Dickinson felt able to 
manipulate and control. Often, she would insist on speaking or playing 
music behind a door held open a few inches. Equally, as a motif, the door 
produced an enormous symbolic range in her poetry – of loss and gain, of 
absence and presence, of separation and connection, even of life and 
death. 
 
Famously, Georg Simmel, the sociologist who is perhaps closest to 
Tarde, also fixed on the door as a key to understanding the particular 
kinds of finiteness of space in the construction of a more general account 
of what Kemple (2007, p2, p1) calls ‘allosociality’; ‘the full spectrum of 
forms of collecting both human and non-human beings’ which ‘is not 
reducible to either social interactions of opposition and duality (hetero), 
nor is it resolvable in relations of symmetry and sameness (homo) or 
modes of reflexivity and selfhood (auto) among human subjects’. Simmel 
argued that the door is always superior to the deadened geometric form of 
the wall; ‘the door is the line of demarcation where the limited and the 
limitless meet, but not in the dead geometrical form of merely a partition 
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wall, but rather as the permanent possibility of continuous alteration’ 
(Simmel, 1909/1994, p410)26. Whereas the wall is mute, the door can 
speak. ‘Moreover, a door more successfully transcends the divide 
between the inner and outer; a door is where the finite borders on the 
infinite; a door marks the plane where separation and connection come 
together, but still remain apart’ (Fuss, 2004, p43). The door functions on 
several levels, therefore. In everyday life, it acts as a threshold for 
negotiating intimacy and anonymity, as a material boundary between the 
public and the private, and as a general feature of Dickinson’s lovingly 
cultivated domestic space. But it can also have much wider resonances, 
for example, as a device for marking asymmetries of power, as a means 
of controlling movement, as a way of separating out the non-human from 
the human. The point is this. Doors are not barriers. They are a potent 
means of both controlling flow and of defining our natures since they 
constitute ‘a link between the space of the human and everything which is 
outside of it’ (Simmel, 1909/1994, p409).  They mean that no bounded 
parcel of space can ever be accorded just one meaning.  
 
So far as this paper is concerned, therefore, doors provide a way of 
thinking about how imitative flow can be channelled and regulated, 
overcoming or resisting the inertia of its own dynamics. Doors exist at all 
levels and rather than act to halt imitative flow (though they can do that) 
they continuously alter – modulate - it by acting, as in Simmel’s work, as 
means of constructing relations through separations. 
 
The prevailing model of sentiment in business is increasingly one in 
which the idea is to use doors in three ways, each of which deploys the 
simultaneous separation and closeness of the door in order to construct 
relationships with the consumer; as a means of producing exactly the 
enclosed domestic and other spaces in which certain sentiments can reign 
by designing objects and spaces which resonate in the ‘heart’ by linking 
form and feeling (e.g. Crawford, 2005), as a means of producing 
allegiance by offering differential access to privileged information, only 
allowing selected people through the door, and as a means of producing 
sentimental journeys in which business is the guide and can charge a toll 
for each stage (Thrift. 2009). 
 
Stages. The third avenue is related too: the engineering of active spaces. 
These spaces do not act as bounded worlds in the old style. Of course, 
these kinds of bounded spaces will continue to persist, becoming more 
spectacular as a result of the development of new technologies – new 
                                                 
26 There are a number of translations of Simmel’s famous essay, ‘The bridge and the door’. I favour the 
translayion by Kaern (1994). See also Frisby (19) and Ritter (1994). 
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materials, new forms of lighting, new information technologies, and so on 
(Thrift, 2008). But even these spaces are being injected with all kinds of 
means of calling to selected demographics so that they provide worlds in 
parallel, so to speak.  
 
That said, these species of space can never act as anything other than 
grand statements, italicizing everyday life. Active spaces start from a 
different premise: they are a means of harnessing and working with 
process in order to produce particular propensities: this continuous 
activity of strategic intervention might be called worlding, with the 
emphasis on the ‘ing’ (Thrift, 2009). Recall the work of Jullien on 
classical China. There the intention was not to control. It was to look for 
the most advantageous conditions and then to help them to grow in 
particular ways. Thus the tactics on a battlefield did not consist of 
producing a model plan and sticking to it. Rather, the commander might 
engage in watchful waiting until an opportune moment could be 
identified in which to intervene forcefully. Equally, victory could be 
achieved by gradually pushing the enemy towards the conclusion that 
they had lost through a host of small but effective measures.  
 
The engineering of active spaces tries to do something similar. The 
intention is not, on the whole, to create fully-formed spaces, dressed to 
kill. Rather it is to add mediological detail into the existing everyday 
spaces through which we endure and are supported which makes these 
spaces resonate in ways which would not have otherwise occurred so that 
they grow in desired directions. Not the creation of discrete worlds into 
which participants enter, then, but a continuous process of worlding. At 
their best, these spaces will act as doors, allowing entry into new worlds 
by adding extra dimensions to existing spaces, so providing extra 
momentum, or by providing the tools, ready-to-hand, for participants to 
create new spaces. Such boosted spaces rely on two developments. The 
first is the continuing history of the development of institutions of public 
intimacy, which has produced both a larger canvas and a means of 
allowing imitative rays to spread both farther and faster. The second is 
what might be called the means of scattering objects and stances that are 
akin to ‘emblem gestures’, the disciplined mobilities of the body by 
which social life is carried through the everyday27, ‘deployed to make 
something happen, to impinge on the behaviour of the self and others’ 
                                                 
27 Gestures like ‘holding up the palm, jerking the thumb, kissing one’s fingertips, pointing, snorting, 
smacking one’s forehead, squeezing a shoulder, bowing, slapping someone on the back, giving the 
shoulder, biting a knuckle, flourishing a fist, tapping the nose, shrugging, chuckling, beating one’s 
breast, giving the finger, winking, and innumerable other visible, haptic, auditory, and tactile 
disciplined mobilities of the semiotic body’ (Rotman, 2008, pp17-18). 
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(Rotman, 2008, p18). ‘Emblem gestures signify and have meaning – 
better have force, affect, point – through the fact of their taking place, in 
the effects they help bring about, in the affectual matrices they support, in 
all that they induce by virtue of their occurrence as events’ (Rotman, 
2008, p19). The brand was an early example of emblematizing activity 
bypassing volition, allowing a ‘gestural’ object designed to be a semiotic 
force to be inserted into everyday life, where it acted as a semiotic 
lighthouse, changing the space that was occupied, for example by 
providing a different frame, in much the same way as gesture does (Lury, 
2005). But we are, quite literally, moving beyond these kinds of 
‘impressed’ hieroglyphics, 
 
Thus, some of the recent developments I have outlined make it possible 
to go beyond such simple sigils, using a mix of new media technologies 
and enhanced calculative capacity to produce something much closer to a 
staged performance in which to perceive the environment is also to 
perceive oneself. First, time structures can be played with so as to 
produce new structures of anticipation. Then, proprioceptive frames can 
be changed so as to signal in directed ways. Last of all, the fund of 
numerical proxies for mindreading skills have increased so that it 
becomes possible to practice empathy in more forms. The net effect is 
clear; it becomes easier to produce influence in any interaction. Each of 
these developments depends both on designing signs and designing their 
context, the one only rarely being able to be divorced from the other. 
These signs are no longer based on only alphabetic codes but on a much 
more extensive logographic ‘vocabulary’ which takes in number and 
calculation on one side and gesture on the other and which depends upon 
a language of geometric calculation for sustenance (Thrift, 2009b).  
 
Let me provide an analogy. We might see such developments as akin to 
the evolution of theatre in the seventeenth century in its potential reach 
(Roach, 2007). At the time, a combination of different actors invented 
new forms of public space, with all their accompanying minutiae like 
props, which gradually produced both a new kind of authenticity and new 
kinds of public intimacy which allowed the production of interested 
publics that did not exist before. These forms of imagined space were 
concerned with performance but their origins as practical spatial arts can 
be found as much in everyday forms of geometry (in activities like 
surveying, navigation, mapping, engineering, building, and the like) as in 
acting; for example, stage practice drew from practical geometry to 
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develop the concepts of plat28-plot and to define the use of scenes as both 
spatial divisions and structures (Turner, 2006). In other words, geometry 
became a crucial element of poetics and theatre itself became a centre of 
empirical knowledge production, a technology best compared to ‘an atlas 
of maps, to a wonderful museum or encyclopaedia, or to the new 
mechanical globes that suddenly reduced the entire human world into 
miniature form – and which may have given the name to the Globe 
Theatre, where Shakespeare’s own company performed as of 1599’ 
(Turner, 2007, p4). These miniature worlds were produced by 
constructing genres (which included specific arrangements of space) in 
which the audience routinely filled in the space by using their own 
imagination. The audience become poetic artisans able to summon and 
control. Active spaces now take this process a stage further (if you will 
excuse the word play) in that they demand infill and even actual 
participation as a matter of course. They too depend upon geometric 
back-up, both to allow movement to take place and be traced and to 
invest the audience with new senses of space (Thrift, 2005). Just as Tudor 
Londoners new-found ability to represent the land and buildings they 
owned geometrically gave them new ways of thinking about staging the 
imaginary and of imagining their incomprehensibly vast city, so the new 
geometry provides a similar prosthetic which in time becomes an innate 
sense of space, helped along by practical spatial arts – techniques akin to 
those of the old workshop -drawn from all kinds of sources – computer 
engineering and software writing, landscape design, computer gaming, 
media location experts, choreographers, the whole gamut of 
contemporary geometric skills. Turner (2006, p30) calls these modular 
skills topographetic; ‘the representation of place by texts of all kinds but 
also by maps, diagrams, paintings or images, and even by built structures 
such as buildings and monuments, particularly when these are approached 
as ‘texts’ with a coherent semiotic function and a communicative 
function’. Proto-experimental, these arts of linking topography and 
cognition depend not upon emblematic iconicity as such but rather upon 
realist modes of iconic presentation in which actual space and time is 
being measured out and signified, allowing mental content to be held and 
distributed in external forms29. Enactive symbols, if you like, depending 
upon a distributed aesthetics. Since ‘perception is always dilated, 
                                                 
28 A term used in geometry tracts and surveying manuals to describe the spatial conceit upon which the 
work of poetry is built which came to mean both a schematic map or diagram and the emplotment of a 
story or a play. 
29 They can be seen as resurrecting the Romantic conviction that geometry constitutes a core set of 
intuitions but equated with the current scientific view that, after millions of years of evolution, we have 
internalized certain ways of doing space and time. As Stafford (2008) points out, we seem to be 
heading towards a radical material monism or even a direct realism. 
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dispersed, distributed’ (Stafford, 2008, p92) we can say that we are 
moved by what is moving30. 
 
To put this another way, the advent of these mobile spaces can be seen as 
permitting the form of naturalism that was Deleuze’s stock-in-trade when 
considering space as a set of circulating refrains. But, we might see 
Deleuuze and Guattari’s transhistorical thoughts on space as only now 
beginning to apply in the human domain in toto as space moves from 
being constructed through circulation between static, consistent and more 
or less architectural sites to circulation, period. Space itself becomes 
vibration, vibration which acts to charm, not unlike the erotic appeal of 
music which, hardly coincidentally, was central to Darwin’s thoughts on 
evolution. 
 
Vibrations, waves, oscillations, resonances affect living bodies, not 
for any higher purpose but for pleasure alone. Living beings are 
vibratory beings: vibration is their mode of differentiation, the way 
they enhance and enjoy the forces of the earth itself. Music is 
‘charming’; that is why it survives and why it is so culturally 
universal (Grosz, 2008, p33). 
 
Territory takes on a different function in this kind of space. Whereas it 
had an inside and an outside and so a passage from one to another; 
through ‘a space that is annexed, outside, contestatory, a resource: a 
cohesion inside, a domain outside, doorways from one to the other and 
energy reserves to enable them to reconfigure or reorchestrate 
themselves’ (Grosz, 2008, p47), this space is more about going through 
doors than it is about boundaries. Territory becomes a fundamentally 
constructive orchestration of tonality. 
 
We might see this orchestration as the next stage of the spatial evolution 
of the attempt to ‘visibilize the compressive structure of attentive 
thought’ (Stafford, 2008, p24)31 in that what becomes clear is that it is 
now possible to produce a mobile tapestry which acts as a permanent 
prosthetic to thinking, just as the denizens of the Neolithic transformed 
the world when fixed sites were first installed in human history as not just 
stopping places but productive nodes, so allowing human and natural 
resources to be rearranged in a very substantial way. But instead of being 
based around the discovery of writing and other graphic forms of 
mediated memory-communication which transformed thought, this stage 
will be based on the manipulation of mediated iconographic images, so as 
                                                 
30 Classically, motion is a key element of emotion. 
31 The brilliant science fiction novel by Watts (2006) tracks many of these changes. 
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to act directly on sensations, affects and intensities (Thrift, 2009). We 
will feel knowledge through dynamic shapes. In other words, the 
dominant model will be art (Grosz, 2008), and the aim will be to produce 
pleasurable and intensifying qualities that can be both partaken of and 
passed on. But this is an art that is becoming a science: art no longer 
imitates life, rather it creates it. There are many ways of achieving an art-
science, of course32, but perhaps the model of such an artform that we are 
coming closest to is that of Francis Bacon, an art which Deleuze (2005) 
describes as ‘figural’ because it relies on the visceral force of painting but 
contained in a part rather than the whole of the painted field;  
 
the figural is, for Deleuze, the end of figuration, the abandonment 
of art as representation, signification, narrative, though it involves 
the retention of the body, planes, and colors, which it extracts from 
the figurative. The figural is the deformation of the sensational and 
the submission of the figurative to sensation. It is the development 
of art as an ‘analogical language’, a non-representational language 
of colors, forms, bodily shapes, screams’ (Grosz, 2008, p88).  
 
Bacon yearned for a future in which brute reality directly impacted on the 
nervous system through the reinvention of a sensuous realism, a kind of 
neuro-art. 
 
As the techniques of the cinema and all forms of recording become 
better and better, so the painter has to be more and more inventive. 
He has to re-invent realism. He has to wash the realism back onto 
the nervous system by his invention, because there isn’t such a 
thing in painting any longer as natural realism. But does one know 
why very often, or nearly always, the accidental images are the 
most real? Perhaps they’ve not been tampered with by the 
conscious brain and therefore come across in a much more real 
sense than something that has been tampered with by 
consciousness (Bacon in Sylvester, 1987, pp177-178). 
 
Now that future of an alternative realism appealing directly to sensation 
and perception is starting to come into being. ‘Presence, presence … this 
is the first word that comes to mind in front of one of Bacon’s paintings’ 
(Deleuze, 2005, p36) and it is the first word that should come to mind in 
understanding the change that are now taking place as art becomes 
                                                 
32 After all, Western art has always been replete with technologies (think only of the perspectival grids 
and optics used in the Renaissance and thereafter) and with discourses on the science of art (think only 
of the Impressionists linkage of the science of colour with painting (Schafer, Saint-George and 
Lewerentz, 2008)). 
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science. What if presence can be re-engineered? Certainly, that is what is 
being attempted. Indeed it might be seen as the construction of a giant 
temporal shortcut. For all their comparative speed, neural and genetic 
changes still take time to impact the body but now, courtesy of new 
technological practices which make appeals directly to particular 
biological territories, simulations of their work can come into existence 
all but immediately as sensations and perceptions33. Animal spirits 
indeed. 
 
Conclusions 
 
I have tried to show how the potential for a new kind of political 
economy of propensity is coming into being, one that is inspired by the 
spirit of Tarde but that also goes beyond his work. That potential arises 
from three sources. To begin with, as we saw in the first part of the paper, 
developments in science allow us to gain a greater analytic hold on the 
way in which imitative rays can spread out and gain traction. Second, and 
in turn, these developments are being tracked in the wild by capitalism 
itself and are gradually being threaded into its very fabric through a 
combination of rhetoric, experiment and intuition. Third, these 
developments suggest ways in which it might be possible to add to 
Tarde’s work in productive ways. I concentrated on three of these, 
namely, the industrial engineering of phenomenology, the design of 
doors, and the production of active spaces out of a ‘cinematic 
mathematics’. 
 
It may be that we are groping towards a different vision of political 
economy, one which has a biocultural foundation, one in which animal 
spirits can be identified and tamed, one in which the engineering of 
propensity can then become a guiding principle. I can at least begin to see 
its outlines, still some way off in the fog but becoming clearer with each 
and every step … 
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